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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE CURTIS BRINSON, 
     Petitioner,  
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
 the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Civ. Nos. 00-cv-06115 & 01-cv-03915) 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21 
June 11, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 








 Curtis Brinson has filed a petition for writ of mandamus.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny that petition. 
                                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Brinson was convicted in 1986 of first degree murder in the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas.  In 2000, Brinson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, see E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 00-cv-06115.  Brinson filed another § 2254 petition 
at E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 01-cv-03915, which was essentially the same petition.  The District 
Court denied both petitions.  We subsequently granted Brinson’s application for a 
certificate of appealability and eventually remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings, see Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania withdrew its opposition to Brinson’s petition, and, on 
March 6, 2007, the District Court issued an order conditionally granting Brinson’s 
petition, vacating his conviction and sentence, and ordering that he be released from 
custody unless the Commonwealth retried him within 120 days. 
 Between March 6, 2007 and January 3, 2008, Brinson’s retrial was continued 
several times, but, finally, on June 19, 2008, a trial date of June 8, 2009 was set.  On July 
16, 2008, Brinson filed an application in the District Court, requesting that the 
conditional writ granted on March 6, 2007 be made absolute.  On October 1, 2008, the 
District Court granted that request and issued an order holding that the Commonwealth 
had failed to fulfill the condition precedent to retry Brinson within 120 days.  The District 
Court declared Brinson’s criminal judgment null and void, issued an absolute writ of 
habeas corpus, and ordered Brinson’s immediate release from custody. 
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 The Commonwealth appealed and sought a stay pending appeal of the District 
Court’s order, which we granted.  The matter was fully brief and argued, and Brinson was 
represented by the Federal Public Defender.  We reversed, holding that the District 
Court’s finding that the continuances granted in Brinson’s state court proceedings were 
chargeable to the Commonwealth was clearly erroneous, and that the 120-day period 
should have been tolled by continuances granted at the request of Brinson’s counsel.  
Brinson v. Vaughn, 339 F. App’x 171, 174-76 (3d Cir. 2009).  Brinson filed a petition for 
a writ of certiorari, which was denied by the United States Supreme Court on January 25, 
2010.  Meanwhile, Brinson was retried in state court and again convicted of first degree 
murder on June 17, 2009. 
 The issue of the enforceability of the District Court’s October 1, 2008 order 
declaring Brinson’s conviction null and void and ordering him released was thus fully 
litigated on appeal and resolved adversely to Brinson.  In the last few years, however, 
Brinson has attempted multiple times to have the federal courts revisit this issue.  In 
April, 2012, Brinson filed a motion to reopen the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), contending that the absolute writ granted to him should be 
restored because the Commonwealth, by its own admission, did not appeal all parts of the 
District Court’s October 1, 2008 order, and, therefore, he was improperly retried.  The 
District Court denied the motion in July, 2012, explaining that, at the heart of Brinson’s 
argument, was his misinterpretation of the procedural circumstances of his case, namely, 
that the October 1, 2008 order was stayed and then reversed by the Court of Appeals; 
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that, although the District Court made its conditional grant of a writ of habeas corpus 
absolute, the appeals court held that the Commonwealth could retry Brinson when it 
reversed the District Court; and that, upon reversal, the October 1, 2008 order no longer 
had any force and effect.  Brinson apparently did not appeal the denial of this Rule 60(b) 
motion to this Court. 
 In 2013, Brinson had four appeals pending in this Court.  At issue in C.A. Nos. 13-
4135 and 13-4136 was Brinson’s motion filed in both his cases, requesting leave to file a 
supplemental brief in support of a request for Rule 60(b)(4) relief.  He also argued that 
we, that is, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, did not have jurisdiction to reverse the 
District Court’s October 1, 2008 order granting him the absolute writ.  The District Court 
denied this motion, noting that Brinson’s earlier, identical Rule 60(b) motion had already 
been denied.  At issue in C.A. Nos. 13-4250 and 13-4251 was Brinson’s motion filed in 
both his cases requesting leave to file another supplemental brief in support of Rule 
60(b)(4) relief.  He again asserted that we had exceeded our power in reversing the 
District Court’s order granting him an absolute writ.  The District Court denied this 
motion, noting that similar motions had already been denied.  We denied certificates of 
appealability in all four of these appeals, or summarily affirmed to the extent that a 
certificate of appealability was not required, on December 23, 2013. 
 On April 16, 2014, Brinson filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) to amend his petitions, again seeking to restore the District Court’s 
October 1, 2008 order granting him an absolute writ and again arguing that the 
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Commonwealth had failed to oppose his request to make his conditional writ absolute.  
He contended that the Commonwealth only opposed his request for immediate release 
and did not oppose making the conditional writ absolute, and he argued that Rule 15(c) 
applied to his case because he was trying to “amplify the facts.”  In orders entered on 
April 18, 2014, the District Court concluded that Brinson was using Rule 15(c) 
improperly to seek reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.  He did not 
assert any new grounds or facts, and, therefore, in addition to being untimely, his motion 
was frivolous.  Brinson appealed, and we denied him a certificate of appealability in 
December, 2014, see C.A. Nos. 14-2021 & 14-2022. 
 Now, in 2015, Brinson has filed a mandamus petition, in which he asks us to 
enforce the District Court’s October 1, 2008 order and release him.  As he did in his 
original Rule 60(b) motion, Brinson argues that the absolute writ granted to him should 
be restored because he was improperly retried. 
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is granted only in extraordinary situations.  See 
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  Generally, mandamus is a 
means “to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to 
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”  Roche v. Evaporated Milk 
Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).  “[M]andamus is not a substitute for appeal and a writ of 
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mandamus will not be granted if relief can be obtained by way of our appellate 
jurisdiction.”  In re Chambers Development Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997)).   
 Brinson does not argue that he has been prevented from making effective use of 
his avenues for appeal, or for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b), for that matter, and 
the issue is not whether he has been successful in using his opportunity for appeal, but 
rather whether relief, if deserved, can be obtained by way of appellate jurisdiction.  
Because relief, if deserved, can be obtained by way of appellate jurisdiction, Brinson’s 
resort to mandamus to enforce the District Court’s October 1, 2008 order is improper.  
See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  
Petitioner’s motion to file a supplemental brief is denied. 
